

THE ANALYSIS OF CATEGORICAL PROPOSITIONS.

I THINK I ought to restate my difficulty about Miss Jones's New Law of Thought, as a note upon it has appeared in *MIND*.

It is, in a word, that the analysis which is plausible for such a proposition as "My first penitent was a murderer" seems to be offered as adequate for "The three angles of every triangle are equal to two right angles". Granting for the sake of argument that the first proposition really means that the same individual possessed the two attributes specified, can we suppose that the second proposition means no more than that in the same individual triangles we find three angles, and also equality of the angles to two right angles? Miss Jones is willing, as I understand, to admit that there can be inseparability of intensions, but is not willing to admit that the proposition can primarily affirm it. It involves, she points out, identity of denotation. But this goes no way to show that identity of denotation is what in such a proposition we want to affirm. It is a question of the very nature and meaning of Science, which consists in affirming laws of connexions of attributes. I cited the 'Story from Thackeray' just to show how very far from a scientific connexion it is possible for an inference from individual identity to be.

As there is a verbal difference from Miss Jones's view in the passage she cites from Mr. Bradley, it may be worth while to point out another which simply and clearly puts her doctrine in its right place. "Every judgment makes a double affirmation, or a single affirmation which has two sides. It asserts a connexion of different attributes, with an indirect reference to an identical subject; or it directly asserts the identity of the subject, with an implication of the difference of its attributes. If you prefer to consider the identity of the subject . . . you read the judgment in extension. If again you emphasise the connexion of the differences, you take the judgment intensionally."¹ What is here given as the extensional rendering is I think precisely Miss Jones's account of the judgment. The difference is that the intensional rendering, which takes the judgment as a connexion of attributes, is treated as the necessary and fundamental interpretation. This appears from the whole argument. Here is the "restriction" under which I said that Miss Jones's view had been stated by previous writers. And my criticism is that the restriction is obviously sound.

¹ *Principles of Logic*, p. 161; cf. p. 93 and pp. 103-105.

The heading of this note, in which I follow Miss Jones, formally confines the problem to categorical propositions. If this were to be understood of such propositions only as have for their subject an individual or collection of individuals, Miss Jones's analysis would *prima facie* cover the ground. But I have offered this eirenicon in my Logic, and I understand that it is not accepted.

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